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THE EFFECT OF A PARDON
HENRY WEIHOFEN t

On January 7, 1939, Governor Olson of California pardoned
Tom Mooney, the labor leader convicted more than twenty years ago
for perpetration of the San Francisco Preparedness Day bombing
of July 22, 1916. "I am convinced", Governor Olson said, "that
Mooney is innocent, that he was convicted on perjured testimony and
is entitled to pardon."
What are the effects of this pardon? That it releases Mooney
from prison and relieves him from further punishment for the offense
is clear; but what is its effect upon his right to vote, his credibility
as a witness, his record as a first or second offender if he is ever again
charged with crime, and most important of all, his "guilt"?
In the leading case of Ex parte Garland, the United States Supreme Court said:
"A pardon reaches both the punishment prescribed for the
offense and the guilt of the offender .

.

.

it releases the pun-

ishment and blots out of existence the guilt, so that in the eye
of the law the offender is as innocent as if he had never committed the offense . .

.

it removes the penalties and disabili-

ties, and restores him to all his civil rights; it makes him, as it
were, a new man, and gives him a new credit and capacity." 1
This statement has been often repeated in other cases, both by
the Supreme Court and by state courts. 2 It would seem, from this,
that Tom Mooney is as fully innocent as if he had never been convicted, or as if he had been acquitted by the court.
I Ph. B.,
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'I. 71 U. S. 333, 380 (1866).
2. Illinois Central Ry. v. Bosworth, 133 U. S. 92, 103 (1889) ; Ex parte Hunt, io
Ark. 284, 288 (185o) ; People v. Hale, 64 Cal. App. 523, 533, 222 Pac. 148, 152 (1923) ;
In re Emmois, 29 Cal. App. 121, 123, 154 Pac. 61g, 62o (1915) ; In the Matter of
Executive Communication, 14 Fla. 318, 319 (1872) ; Dade Coal Co. v. Haslett, 83 Ga.

549, 551, Io S. E. 435 (1889); United States v. Athens Armory, 35 Ga. 344, 363
(1868) ; Kelley v. State, 204 Ind. 612, 625, 185 N. E. 453, 458 (1933) ; Cowan v.

Prowse, 93 Ky. 156 172, 19 S. W. 407, 411 (1892) ; State v. Baptiste and Martini, 26
La. Ann. 134, 137 &1874) ; Penobscot Bar v. Kimball, 64 Me. 140, 146 (1875) ; Jones

v. Board of Registrars, 56 Miss. 766, 768 (1879) ; People v. Court of Sessions, 141
N. Y. 288, 294, 36 N. E. 386, 388 (1894) ; State v. Keith, 63 N. C. 140, 143 (1868) ;
Knapp v. Thomas, 39 Ohio St. 377, 381 (1883) ; Wood v. Fitzgerald, 3 Ore. 568, 577
(187o) ; Diehl v. Rodgers, 169 Pa. 316, 322, 32 Atl. 424, 426 (1895) ; Carr v. State, 19
Tex. App. 635, 661 (1885) ; It re Conditional Discharge of Convicts, 73 Vt. 414, 428,
51 Atl. 10, 14 (igoi) ; Edwards v. Commonwealth, 78 Va. 39, 43 (1883). In addition
see 4 BL. COMM. *402; 7 BACON, ABRIDGIENT (186o) 415; STEPHEN, COMMENTARIES
ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND (14th ed. 1903) 4, 422.
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In another case, however, the United States Supreme Court
spoke of the "confession of guilt implied in the acceptance of a pardon . .

."

3 And the Virginia and West Virginia courts have said:

"Pardon may rescue him from the penitentiary or a halter, but it
cannot redeem him from the infamy of conviction." 4
Which is correct? Has Mr. Mooney been cleared of guilt, or
merely relieved of further punishment for his crime?
Almost twenty-five years ago, Professor Williston discussed the
confused state of the cases, and suggested that the correct rule was
as follows:
"The pardon removes all legal punishment for the offense.
Therefore if the mere conviction involves certain disqualifications which would not follow from the commission of the crime
without conviction, the pardon removes such disqualifications.
On the other hand, if character is a necessary qualification and
the commission of a crime would disqualify even though there
had been no criminal prosecution for the crime, the fact that the
criminal has been convicted and pardoned does not make him
any more eligible." '
The objection to this rule is that it makes no distinction between
pardons granted for innocence and pardons granted for other reasons.
It is submitted that Professor Williston's rule is correct as applied
to pardons not granted for innocence, but that pardons granted for
this reason should have much broader effect; pardons for innocence
should, in the words of the United States Supreme Court, reach both
the punishment and the guilt of the offender, and should blot out the
guilt as effectively as if he had never committed the offense.
Indeed, to pardon a man for being innocent is a paradox at best.
Such a person is entitled to a reversal of the erroneous conviction,
and a judicial decision of acquittal (not to mention compensation for
the wrong the state has done him). Probably we should liberalize
our rules of criminal procedure so as to permit judicial correction of
such mistaken convictions at any time. Continental codes are much
6
more liberal in this respect than Anglo-American law.
But while lack of more logical remedy forces us to rely upon
the pardoning power to correct such mistakes, justice requires that a
pardon granted for this reason be given broader effects than a pardon
granted for preventing a prison-break, for example. It may be that
3. Burdick v. United States, 236 U. S. 79, 91 (1914).

4. Ball v. Commonwealth, 8 Leigh 726, 728 (Va. 1837), quoted in Younger v.
State, 2 W. Va. 579, 584 (1868).
5. Williston, Does a Pardon Blot Out Guilt? 28 HARv. L. REv. 647, 653 (I915).
6. See, for example, the German STRAFPROZETz-ORDNUNG, § 359 if.
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the real perpetrator of the crime has later confessed, and his confession proved true. If it is too late for the courts to reverse the erroneous conviction, are we to say that the governor by pardon can only
relieve the unfortunate victim of the mistake from the punishment,
but must leave him to carry to the grave the stigma of guilt for a crime
of which he has been officially and even conclusively proved innocent?
Surely no one would argue for such an outrageous rule. A pardon
granted for innocence, if it is to serve its purpose, must be given the
same effect as a judicial acquittal.
It is equally clear, however, that no such broad effect should be
given to pardons granted for other reasons. A prisoner pardoned for
good behavior in prison, or one given a pardon after service of his
sentence, in order to restore his civil rights, should not thereupon resume the position of an innocent man, but should continue to be regarded as a convicted criminal who has served time in the penitentiary for his crime. If again convicted of a new crime, he should
be treated as a second offender; if offered as a witness in court, his
credibility should be subject to the same suspicion as that of any other
convicted criminal.
In short, no rational rule as to the effect of a pardon can be
stated without distinguishing clearly between pardons granted for innocence and pardons granted for other reasons. A pardon for innocence
is an acquittal, and must be given all the effects of an acquittal. A
pardon for other reasons is not an acquittal; it leaves the determination of the convict's guilt stand, and only relieves him from the legal
consequences of that guilt.
With this distinction in mind, we can review the cases on the subject, and perhaps reduce them to order.
Since, as already said, it is generally agreed that even a pardon
not granted for innocence has the effect of relieving from all the legal
consequences of conviction, there is no difficulty as to any effect which
is clearly a "legal consequence" of conviction. This includes not only
freedom from any further incarceration or other legal punishment
for the crime, but also such other effects as the loss of civil rights.
"The doctrine has generally been accepted by the courts that a pardon,
unless limited, restores one to the customary civil rights which ordinarily belong to a citizen of a state." 7 In some states the constitution or statutes specifically so provide; 8 but the courts have generally
7. State v. Hazzard, 139 Wash. 487, 492, 247 Pac. 957, 959 (1926). See also Jones
v. Board of Registrars, 56 Miss. 766, 768 (1879) ; Wood v. Fitzgerald, 3 Ore. 568, 577

(1870).

8. C.. GEN. LAWS (Deering, Supp. 1933) Act I9o8a, § I, p. 1299; COLO. CONST.
Art. VII, § io; GA. CoNsT. Art. II, 2, 4; KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. (935) §21-122;
LA. CODE CRIm. PRoc. ANN. (Dart, 1932) § 736; 4 Mo. STAT. ANN. (Vernon, 1932)
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held this to be true even without such specific provision.9 The right to
vote, 10 to serve on a jury," and to testify as a witness,' 2 are among
the civil rights restored by an unconditional pardon, no matter on what
ground it was granted.
Probably the majority of pardons granted throughout the country
are for the purpose of restoring these civil rights, after service of
sentence. In England and in Pennsylvania, pardons for this purpose
are unnecessary, for statutes provide that service of the sentence shall
have the same effect as a pardon.' 3 The courts have construed these
statutes rather literally, to give all the effects of an actual pardon.' 4 To
hold that such a "pardon" absolves from guilt and makes the ex-convict
§ 4172;

MONT. REV. CODES ANN. (Anderson and McFarland, 1935) § 12263; OHIO
CODE ANN. (Throckmorton, 1936) §13458-1; NEB. COmP. STAT. (1929) §29-113

setble.
9. Werner v. State, 44 Ark. 122, 40 S. W. 374 (1884). There was a similar holding in Yarborough v. State, 41 Ala. 405 (1868), but the rule in Alabama has since
been changed by constitutional amendment. ALA. CoNsT. Art. V, § 124.
Indeed, a full pardon restored such rights even though the governor adds a proviso
that it should not relieve from legal disabilities. People v. Pease, 3 Johns. 333 (N. Y.
1803). This is not true in Alabama or Nevada, however. In these states, restoration
to citizenship must be specifically expressed in the pardon. ALA. CoNsT. Art. V, § 124;
ALA. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1928) § 365; NEV. CoMp. LAWs (193o) § 11557.
io. In the Matter of Executive Communication, 14 Fla. 318 (1872) ; Wood v. Fitzgerald, 3 Ore. 568 (187o); Op. An'y GEN. OF Wis. (19o8) 293. In Maryland the

constitution provides that a pardon restores the right to vote to anyone who has lost
this privilege by virtue of having been convicted of an infamous crime after reaching
the age of 21. MD. CoNsT. Art. I, § 2. This has been construed to mean that if the
person was under 21 at the time of conviction, a pardon is not necessary to restore the
voting privilege. I5 REP. & Op. ATr'y GEN. OF MD. (1930) 109; 2o REP. & Op. ATr'y
GEN. OF MD. (1935) 618.
In Connecticut and Rhode Island, the right to vote can be restored only by an act of
the legislature. CONN. CONsT. Amend. XVII; CONN. GEN. STAT. (Supp. 1935) § 787c;
R. I. CONsT. Art. II, § 4. Under the Rhode Island constitution, an executive pardon
restores all privileges except that of voting. Opinion of the Judges, 4 R. I. 583 (1858).
Foreman v. Baldwin, 24 Ill. 298 (186o), holds that a governor's pardon cannot restore
competency where the statute provides that a person convicted of certain named
offenses shall be deemed infamous and shall forever after be rendered incapable of
holding any office of honor, trust, or profit, or of voting at any general election or serving as a juror or giving testimony. But the case seems wrong. The pardoning power
is conferred by the constitution and cannot be limited by the legislature. Cf. People v.
Pease, 3 Johns. 333 (N. Y. 18o3).
In North Carolina, restoration of the right to vote is by court order. N. C. CODE
ANN. (Michie, 1935) § 385. See also id. § 390.
A person convinced of a Federal offense and pardoned by the President is restored
to the right to vote in state elections. Cowan v. Prowse, 93 Ky. 156, 19 S. W. 407
(1892) ; Jones v. Board of Registrars, 56 Miss. 766 (1879). And apparently this is the
only way the right can be restored in such cases. REP. ATr'y GEN. OF MINN. (1933)
8 399.
ii. Easterwood v. State, 34 Tex. Cr. R. 400, 31 S. W. 294 (1895); Puryear v.
Commonwealth, 83 Va. 5I, 1 S. E. 512 (1887); State ex tel. Collins, v. Lewis, III La.
693, 35 So. 816 (1904) (right to serve on a grand jury).
12. But the fact of conviction may be shown to impeach credibility. See notes
21-24 ldra.
13. 9 GEo. IV, c. 32, § 3 (1828) ; PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 1930) tit. i9, § 893.
The English act excepts capital crimes; Pennsylvania excepts first degree murder and
perjury. In Nebraska, the discharge warrant granted on expiration of sentence restores civil rights. NE. ComP. STAT. (1929) § 29-2634; see Turley v. State, 74 Neb.
471, 476, 104 N. W. 934, 936 (1905).
14. Leyman v. Latimer, 3 Ex. D. r5 (1877), aff'd, 3 Ex. D. 352 (1877); United
States ex rel. Malesevic v. Perkins, 17 F. Supp. 851 (W. D. Pa. 1936).
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"as innocent as if he had never committed the crime" would be absurd.
Yet that absurd result has actually been reached under the Pennsylvania act. Under the immigration law, providing for deportation of
aliens convicted of a felony involving moral turpitude, a federal court
has held that an alien convicted in Pennsylvania who has served his
sentence cannot be deported because he has been "pardoned". 15
This case is an extreme example of the mischief that results when
a court applies literally the unfounded dictum of Ex parte Garlandthat
a pardon "blots out" guilt, and makes the offender a "new man", etc.
The case demonstrates also the necessity of distinguishing between pardons for innocence and pardons for other reasons. Service of sentence under these statutes should certainly not be given the effect of a
pardon for innocence, but only that of a pardon for reasons other than
innocence, i. e., to absolve from further punishment and restore civil
rights, but not to undo what is past or blot out of existence a fact,
namely, that the person has committed a crime and been sentenced and
punished for it.1'
Although restoration of the right to vote and the right to hold
office are usually mentioned together among the effects of a pardon,
there is more room for doubt in the latter case. According to the distinction suggested by Professor Williston, it would seem that if good
moral character is one of the required qualifications for the office, it
should be held that conviction for crime proves lack of such moral
character, even though the crime itself has been pardoned, unless the
pardon was granted on the ground of innocence. What little authority there is on the question seems to agree, however, that even a pardon granted for other reasons restores the right to hold office. 17 Offices
forfeited by the conviction, of course, are not automatically restored
by a pardon.' 8
15. United States ex rel. Malesevic v. Perkins, 17 F. Supp. 851 (W. D. Pa. 1936).
16. Cf. United States ex rel. Palermo v. Smith, 17 F. (2d) 534 (C. C. A. 2d, 1927)
and Weedin v. Hempel, 28 F. (2d) 6o3 (C. C. A. 9th, 1928), both holding that under
the provision for deportation of aliens who have been guilty of felonies involving moral
turpitude, the fact that the offense has been pardoned ip immaterial.
17. See Hildreth v. Heath, I Ill. App. 82, 87 (1878), where the court said that a
Presidential pardon for a federal offense would remove the disqualification, if any, to
hold the office of alderman, although the city charter declared that persons convicted
of malfeasance, bribery, etc., shall be ineligible. See also general dicta to the effect
that a pardon restores one to all civil rights, including the right to hold office. See
State v. Hazzard, 139 Wash. 487, 492,, 247 Pac. 957, 959 (1926) ; OP. Arr'y GEN. OF
COLO. (1933-34) 159. In California, a 'restoration to citizenship" is distinguished from
a full pardon. The latter restores the right to hold office, but the former does not.

Donham v. Gross,

210

Cal. I9o,

290

Pac. 884

(1930).

18. State v. Carson, 27 Ark. 469 (1872) ; State ex tel. Webb v. Parks, 122 Tenn.
230, 122 S. W. 977 (19og). A Florida statute expressly states that a pardon does not
restore offices forfeited. FLA. ComP. GEN. LAws ANN. (Skillman, 1927) § 8495. See
King v. Turvil, i Freem. 197, 198, 89 Eng. Rep. R. 140 (K. B. 1675), where it was
said, "In case of simony, though the King doth pardon the simony, yet the disability remains still upon the person and renders him incapable of the benefice"; Smith v. Shel-
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The question of the competency of a pardoned criminal to testify
as a witness is complicated by a number of factors. At common law,
persons who had been convicted of infamous crimes or crimen falsi
were held incompetent to testify, on the theory that a man who has
been guilty of a heinous crime cannot be trusted.' 9 And Coke said
this was true even though the offense had been pardoned.2 0 (But if
the reason for the pardon was that the person was in fact innocent of
the crime, should he not be competent? Coke does not consider this,
but seems to have in mind only pardons granted for other reasons.)
But Coke's rule did not prevail. The law soon adopted the rule that
a pardon gives a person a "new credit" and restores his capacity to
testify, although the fact of conviction might still be shown to affect
his credibility. 2
But this rule too seems unsound. If the law is corbourn, Cro. Eliz. 685, 686 (1598). But cf. Bennet v. Easedale, Cro. Car. 55 (1626),
where it was held that a pardon of a sentence in the spiritual court of fine, imprisonment, and deprivation, for bribery in the office of chancellor of the archbishop of York,
discharged not only the sentence but the consequent disabilities, and enabled the person
to continue in the office. And Coke cites the case of a parson convicted of adultery and
later pardoned, who was held to be reinstated in his living, even though another had
meanwhile been admitted and inducted. 6 Co. 14, 77 Eng. Rep. R. 273.
19. I WIGMORE, EvIcE
(2d ed. 1923) § 519.
20. Brown v. Crashaw, 2 Bulst. i54, 8o Eng. Rep. R. 1028 (1614).
21. Boyd v. United States, i42 U. S. 450 (1892) ; Yarborough v. State, 41 Ala. 405

(1868) (but this apparently is not the rule today under ALA. CoNsT. Art. V, § 124) ;
Werner v. State, 44 Ark. x22 (1884) ; People v. Bowen, 43 Cal. 439 (1872) ; Trackman
v. People, 22 Colo. 83, 43 Pac. 662 (1896) ; State v. Timmons, 2 Harr. 528 (Del. 1833) ;
State v. Grant, 33 Del. 195, 133 Atl. 790 (1926) ; Singleton v. State, 38 Fla. 297, 21 So.
21 (1896) ; Roberson v. Woodfork, 155 Ky. 2o6, 159 S. W. 793 (913) ; State v. Baptiste and Martini, 26 La. Ann. 134 (1874) ; State v. Kirchner, 23 Mo. App. 349 (1886);

State v. Blaisdell, 33 N. H. 388 (I856) ; Curtis v. Cochran, 5o N. H. 242 (1870);
Territory of New Mexico v. Chavez, 8 N. M. 528, 45 Pac. 1107 (I896); People v.

Pease, 3 Johns. 333 (N. Y. 18o3) ; United States v. Jones, 2 Wheel. Cr. C. 451 (N. Y.
1824) ; Diehl v. Rodgers, i69 Pa. 316, 32 Atl. 424 (1895); Jones v. Harris, I

Strob. L. i6o (S. C. 1846) ; State v. Dodson, I6 S. C. 453 (i88i) ; Watson v. State,
9o Tex. Cr. R. 576, 237 S. W. 298 (1922); Hunnicutt v. State, i8 Tex. App. 498
(i885) ; Bennett v. State, 24 Tex. App. 73, 5 S. W. 527 (1887) ; Crosby's Case, Skin-

ner 578, 9o Eng. Rep. R. 259 (1695) ; Rookwood's Case, Holt K. B. 683, 685, 9o Eng.
Rep. R. 1277 (1696).

Where a person convicted of two offenses is granted a pardon for one of them, he
remains under the disability. State v. Foley, i5 Nev. 64 (I88O) ; Miller v. State, 46

Tex. Cr. R. 59, 79 S. W. 567 (904).

In the older cases, there was some disagreement as to whether a perjuror who had
been pardoned was competent. See 2 HAWKINS, PLEAS OF THE CROWN, c. 37, § 52,
where the question is said to be "not clearly settled". In Thompson v. United States,
202 Fed. 401 (C. C. A. 9th, 1913) it was held that a pardoned perjurer was competent.
But see Anglea v. Commonwealth, io Gratt. 696, 699 (Va. 1853).
The old English cases also disagreed on the question whether there must be a
burning in the hand as well as a pardon, to remove the disqualification. See cases cited
in I WIGMORI, EVIDENCE (2d ed. 1923) § 523, n. 2.
It was held in some cases that where the disability rested not upon common law, but
upon express words of a statute, it could not be ren'oved by a pardon, the pardoning
prerogative of the sovereign being controlled by the authority of the express law. Thus,
it was held in England that while a pardon will restore to competency a person indicted
at common law for perjury, if he is indicted under the statute of 5 ELIz. c. 9, which
expressly declares that no person convicted and attainted of perjury or subornation of
perjury shall be received as a witness, he will not be rendered competent by a pardon.
Rex v. Ford, 2 Salk. 69o, 91 Eng. Rep. R. 585 (700) ; Dover v. Maestaer, 5 Esp. 92,
94, 170 Eng. Rep. R. 749 (803) ; 3 RussELL, CRimEs (9th Am. ed. 1877) 621. This rule
was followed in a few American cases governed by state statutes. Foreman v. Baldwin,
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rect in its assumption that a convicted felon is not to be trusted, does
he become more trustworthy for having been pardoned? Here again,
the only logical approach to the problem must be based on the distinction between a pardon for innocence and other pardons. If the pardon
was granted because the prisoner had political influence, or was a model
prisoner, or behaved bravely in a prison fire, the pardon should not
affect his credibility at all. The damage to his credibility, to follow
Professor Williston's distinction, is not a legal consequence of the conviction; the conviction is merely evidence that he is untrustworthy,
a fact not wiped out by the pardon. On the other hand, if the pardon
was granted for innocence, the whole presumption falls. It is only
the man guilty of crime who is presumed untrustworthy; if he was
not guilty, he has no blot on his credibility. In other words, this rule
is wrong as to both kinds of pardons. It is wrong in giving a pardon
not for innocence any effect whatever as to the competency of the witness; and it is wrong in holding (if indeed it was ever intended to hold)
that a person wrongly convicted and later pardoned on the express
ground that he was innocent and wrongly convicted, may still have
his credibility impeached because of this erroneous conviction!
Probably the reason why this illogical rule arose is that it was
felt that the entire presumption that conviction of a heinous crime
wholly disqualified a witness was unsound. Bentham in the I6oo's
lucidly exposed the fallacies of the assumption,2 2 and legislation today
has almost everywhere abolished the rule, although it remains in force
in a few jurisdictions and in others it is retained for the crime of perjury.2 3 In most states, statutes now make the testimony of convicted
persons admissible, even without a pardon, but the fact of conviction
may be shown to affect credibility. That the offense has been pardoned is immaterial. 24 As applied to pardons not granted for innoIlL. 298 (186o) ; Houghtaling v. Kelderhouse, I Park. Cr. R. 241 (N. Y. I85I) ; Evans
v. State, 7 Baxt. 12 (Tenn. 1872). Contra: Diehl v. Rodgers, 169 Pa. 316, 32 Atl. 424
(1895). But while this rule may have been sound in England, it seems inapplicable
here. In England, Parliament is supreme, and the prerogatives of the crown may be
limited by statute; whereas in this country, the pardoning power of the executive is
usually defined by the constitution, and may not be restricted by legislation. If a pardon, in the absence of legislation, has the effect of restoring competency, no legislation
should be able to deny this effect.
22. 5 BENTHAm, RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL EVIDENCE (1827) bk. IX, pt. III, c. IV.
23. See statutes summarized in I WiGmoRE, EVIDENCE (2d ed. 1923) § 488.
24. Vedin v. McConnell, 22 F. (2d) 753 (C. C. A. 9th, 1927) ; Terry v. State, 25
Ala. App. 135, 148 So. 157 (932),
cert. denied, 226 Ala. 685, 148 So. 159 (1933) ;
State v. Serfling, 131 Wash. 605, 230 Pac. 847 (1924); cases cited in 59 A. L. R.
1489; 47 L. R. A. (N. S.) 206, 215. But see State v. Taylor, 172 La. 20, 26, 133 So.
349, 351 (i93i), where the court held that a pardon "blots out" guilt, and so 're-establishes the witness's credibility; and People v. Hardwick, 204 Cal. 582, 588, 269 Pac.
427, 430 (1928), where the court seemed to say the same.
Even though the pardon does not itself restore credibility, most courts agree that
proof of the pardon is admissible. State v. Serfling, supra, and other cases cited above.
24
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cence, this is a sound rule. Insofar as conviction of crime is evidence
bearing upon a witness' truthfulness, it is not affected by such a pardon. Where the pardon was granted for innocence, however, this is a
legal determination that he was not actually guilty of crime, and so is
not in fact a convicted criminal, and the erroneous conviction should
not be used to impeach his credibility.
Whether a pardon so far "blots out" an offense that it cannot be
counted as a previous conviction under second offender laws is the
subject of a sharp conflict of authority. The courts of Indiana, Louisiana, ,Ohio, Texas and Virginia, applying the broad dictum that a pardon completely blots out the offense, hold that a pardoned offense cannot be counted as a previous conviction, if the person is later convicted
of a new crime. 25 But we have already pointed out that as to pardons
not granted for innocence, this generality is incorrect.
The question remains, however, whether increased punishment for
a subsequent offense is a legal consequence of the prior conviction.
That it is has been forcefully argued by the Texas Court of Criminal
Appeals:
"To hold on the one hand that a full pardon absolves its
grantee from all legal consequences of the conviction, and on the
other that by virtue of the law, and with its sanction, the fact of
such conviction may be thereafter pleaded and proved in order
to increase such grantee's punishment in a subsequent case, and
that such holdings are not in conflict, seems to us but a play on
words, a sort of fraud on reason and logic. The enhancement
of the punishment in the second prosecution depends on the former conviction; and of stark necessity, such enhancement is in
consequence of such former conviction, and in strict legal consequence thereof." 26
This seems to be all that is properly held in People v. Hardwick, supra, and the court's
discussion of the "blotting out" effect of a pardon may be regarded as dictum. Thus
where the credibility of a witness was attacked by proof of conviction for felony, it was
held admissible to show that a pardon had been promptly granted and the reasons
therefor. Sisson v. Yost, 58 Hun 6og, 12 N. Y. Supp. 373 (1890).
In two cases, however, proof of the pardon was held inadmissible. Gallagher v.
People, 211 Ill. I58, 71 N. E. 842 (19o4) ; Martin v. Commonwealth, 25 Ky. L. Rep.
1928 (1904).
In the former case, the court said: "Under the statute, the guilt or innocence of the defendant of the crime for which he had been convicted, his punishment,
his term of service, etc., are wholly immaterial and incompetent. That he may have
been pardoned proves nothing as to his credibility, and to permit evidence of that fact
would simply be to introduce into the case a collateral issue." Gallagher v. People,
supra, at 169, 71 N. E. at 847.
25. Kelley v. State, 204 Ind. 612, 185 N. E. 453 (1933) ; State v. Lee, 171 La. 744,
132 So. 219 (1931) ; State v. Martin, 59 Ohio St. 212, 52 N. E. 188 (1898) ; State v.
Anderson, 7 Ohio N. P. 562 (1896) ; Scrivnor v. State, 113 Tex. Cr. R. 194, 20 S. W.
(2d) 416 (xI28), 14 MINN. L. REV. 293, 3 So. CALF. L. REV. 438 (1930) ; Edwards v.
Commonwealth, 78 Va. 39 (1883); see Tucker v. State, 14 Okla. Cr. R. 54, 64, 167
Pac. 637, 64o (1917) ; Freeman v. State, 118 Tex. Cr. R. 67, 39 S. W. (2d) 895 (1931)

semble.
26. Scrivnor v. State, 113 Tex. Cr. R. 194, 196,

20 S. W. (2d)

416, 417 (1928).
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The opposite view has been taken by the courts of Kentucky, New
York and Washington.2 7 These courts hold that although an unconditional pardon prevents further punishment and cancels all other legal
consequences of the conviction, the fact of conviction remains; and to
take this fact into account in determining the proper penalty for a
subsequent offense is not a legal consequence of the former conviction,
but is merely giving due weight to material evidence indicating the
defendant's character, namely, that he is a recidivist or habitual criminal. The punishment under the habitual offender laws is solely for
the last offense, and the fact that the defendant has been convicted
before is used merely to determine the proper punishment.
This seems the sounder view. When the question has arisen in
other connections, the courts-including the Texas court-have agreed
in holding that the increased punishment under habitual criminal acts
is inflicted not for prior offenses but solely for the last one. Therefore, such a statute enacted after the first offense is not ex post facto; 28
nor does it place the defendant twice in jeopardy for the same offense; 29
therefore also the legislature may provide that a prior conviction in
another state shall be counted. 30 Not only in legal theory, but also as
a matter of policy, there seems no reason why all previous convictions,
including those pardoned (unless for innocence), should not be counted
in determining whether the defendant is a repeater, deserving the stiffer
penalty provided by the law for such offenders. In England, this rule
31
is adopted by statute.
Of course, pardons for innocence, as we have insisted throughout
this article, must be treated differently. To punish a man as a second
offender, when his first conviction has been pardoned on the ground
27. Mount v. Commonwealth, 2 Duv. 93 (Ky. 1865); Herndon v. Commonwealth,
105 Ky. 197, 48 S. W. 989 (i8g) ; People v. Carlesi, I54 App. Div. 481, 139 N. Y.
Supp. 3o9 (ist Dep't 1913), aff'd, 208 N. Y. 547, 1oi N. E. 1114 (1913), aff'd, 233 U. S.
51 (1914); People v. McIntyre, 99 Misc. 17, 163 N. Y. Supp. 528 (Sup. Ct. 1917);
People ex rel. Malstrom v. Kaiser, 135 Misc. 67, 236 N. Y. Supp. 619 (Sup. Ct. 1929) ;
Commonwealth v. Vitale, 35 Lack. Jur. 85 (Pa. 1933) ; State v. Edelstein, 146 Wash.
221, 262 Pac. 622 (1927) ; see State v. Webb, 36 N. D. 235, 243, 162 N. W. 358, 361
(1917); i Op. ATIr'Y GEN. OF Wis. (1930) 139; 22 Op. Arr'y GEN. OF VIs. (1933)
1009.

28. State v. Norris, 203 Iowa 327, 21o N. W. 922 (1926), 12 IowA L. REv. 299
(1927) ; Jones v. State, 9 Okla. Cr. R. 646, 133 Pac. 249 (913), 48 L. R. A. (N. s.)
204; cases cited in Notes (1929) 58 A. L. R. 20, 21, (I933) 82 A. L. R. 345, 347.
("He
29. Kinney v. State, 45 Tex. Cr. R. 500, 78 S. W. 225, 79 S. W. 570 (904)
is not again punished for the first offense, but that is used as evidence, in the second
and subsequent offenses, in order to increase his punishment", id. at 503, 79 S. W. at
571) ; and cases cited in Note (1929) 58 A. L. R. 20, 23.

.3o. Arnold v. State, 127 Tex. Cr. R. 89, 74 S. W. (2d) 997 (1934) (prior conviction in a Federal court, though for a crime committed within Texas) ; and cases cited
in Notes (1929) 58 A. L. R. 20, 39, (I933) 82 A. L. R. 345, 357.
31. The Criminal Law Act of 1827, 7 & 8 GEo. IV, C. 28, § 13, providing that a
royal warrant under the sign manual has the effect of a pardon under the great seal,
expressly provides that no such warrant shall affect the punishment to which the
offender might be liable on a subsequent conviction for felony.
TARIES ON THE LAws OF ENGLAND (I5th ed. i9o8) 415.

4 STEPHEN, COMMEN-

186

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

that he was in fact innocent, would be the rankest injustice. None of
the cases cited above in fact involved pardons granted for reasons of
innocence. Probably no court would apply the rule in such cases. In
Iowa, the matter is expressly covered by statute, providing that a pardon for any of the previous convictions will not preclude a sentence
for habitual criminality, unless the defendant can show to the satisfaction of the court that the pardon was granted for reasons of innocence.

32

A similar question arises under statutes such as that of Texas,
providing that a suspended sentence should not be granted to any criminal defendant previously convicted of felony. Suppose the defendant
had been previously convicted but pardoned; can he now say that he
has not been previously convicted, and so is eligible for a suspended
sentence? There is no express decision on the question,"3 but what
has been said above would apply here. Such a person should not be
allowed to deny that he has been previously convicted, unless the pardon
was for innocence. Pardons granted for other reasons do not "blot
out" the fact of conviction.
Similar also is the question involved in the following situation:
a defendant convicted of crime is given a parole or a suspended sentence, revocable if he should commit another crime. He is later convicted of a new crime, but is pardoned. Is this pardoned crime ground
for revoking the suspension or parole? Again, the same principle
should apply; and presumably courts holding that a pardoned offense
may be counted in administering habitual criminal acts would also hold
that a pardoned offense constitutes grounds for revoking suspension
of a sentence of parole. 34 Only if the pardon has been granted for
innocence should it prevent the conviction from constituting ground
for revocation.
Conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude is made a ground
for divorce in many states. It has been held that a pardon does not
destroy this ground, even though the divorce action is not brought
until after the pardon has been granted.
The pardon in this case
32. IOWA CODE (1935)

§

13402.

33. In Warren v. State, 127 Tex. Cr. R. 71, 74 S. W. (2d) ioo6 (934), the question was raised, but the court found it unnecessary to decide it, because the pardon was
held to be a conditional one merely, which concededly did not have the effect of blotting
out the offense.
34. In Texas, where it is held that a pardoned offense may not be counted in applying the habitual criminal act, the court has held that a pardoned offense is not a
ground for revocation of suspension of sentence. Sanders v. State, io8 Tex. Cr. R. 467,
I S. W. (2d) goi (0928), 41 HARV. L. REv. 918; accord: Op. ATT'y GEN. OF PA., 27
Dist. 83o (Pa. i918).
35. Holloway v. Holloway, 126 Ga. 459, 55 S. E. 19I (1go6). Where the pardon
is granted after divorce proceedings are begun, it does not destroy the statutory ground.
Davidson v. Davidson, 23 Dist. 578 (Pa. 1914).
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does not seem to have been granted on the ground of innocence, and
so the result seems correct. But a pardon for innocence should, as we
have said, wipe out the conviction for all purposes, and so should
destroy its effect as a ground for divorce also. Where the divorce has
already been made final before the pardon is granted, the matter is
more difficult. Divorce, like marriage, should not be easily annulled.
The spouse obtaining the divorce may have remarried. Public policy
may require that the divorce should be allowed to stand, even though
by executive action the divorced spouse is later declared innocent of
the crime and pardoned, and the ground upon which the divorce was
obtained thereby nullified.36
The effect of a pardon upon one's qualification under various
licensing laws is governed by general principles already laid down.
Where the licensing provision is designed to restrict certain occupations or privileges to persons having certain moral qualifications, and
for that reason disqualify persons convicted of crime, a pardon should
not remove the disability, unless granted for innocence.
Two cases illustrate the confusion of thinking which results from
failure to distinguish between pardons for innocence and other pardons in determining the effect upon eligibility under license laws. In
a New York case, under a rule of the city licensing commissioner that
applicants for taxi licenses who had been convicted of felony should
be rejected, it was held proper to deny a license to an applicant whose
crime had been pardoned. The court said that "A pardon proceeds
not upon the theory of innocence, but implies guilt", and that "the executive act did not obliterate the fact of the conviction". 3 ' That a
pardon "implies guilt" is true of some pardons, of course, but to say
this of all pardons requires ignoring the fact that pardons are sometimes granted for innocence. Since there is nothing to indicate that
this was the ground for the pardon involved in this case, the result is
correct, however.
In an English case,38 it was held that under a statute which read,
"Every person convicted of felony shall for ever be disqualified from
selling spirits by retail, and no license to sell spirits by retail shall be
granted to any person who shall have been so convicted. . .

pardon removes the disqualification.

.",

a

Pollock, B., reached this result

36. Statutes sometimes expressly provide that where a pardon is obtained after a
divorce on this ground, the pardon does not vitiate the divorce or restore marital rights.
NEB. ComP. STAT. (1929) c. 42, § 301; Wis. STAT. (935) § 247.07 (3). See also S. D.
ComP. LAWS (1929) § iog. These statutes seem to apply to pardons granted for innocence as well as others.
37. Baldi v. Gilchrist, 2o4 App. Div. 425, 427-428, 198 N. Y. Supp. 493, 495 (Ist
Dep't 1923). The first quotation given is quoted from Roberts v. State, 16o N. Y. 217,
221, 54 N. E. 678, 679 (1899).

38. Hay v. Justices,

24

Q. B. D. 561 (i8go).
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by taking at face value dicta of previous cases and writers that a pardon takes away "not only poenam, but reatum. .
." Hawkins, J.,
concurring, was impressed by the fact that a pardon might be granted
to a person wrongly convicted (although that apparently was not the
case before the court), and argued that it would be a bad result if a
pardon under those conditions should not restore the innocent person
to the right to follow his avocation.
Thus, one court reaches one result by positing the proposition that
a pardon "implies guilt"-which is usually true, but not always. The
other court reaches the opposite result by pointing out that sometimes
a pardon implies innocence-and then seems to feel bound to give the
same effect to the pardon in the case before it, although that was not
granted for innocence. Hawkins, J. was obviously influenced by the
thought that unless this pardon were held to re-establish the applicant's
qualification, no pardon, even one granted for innocence, could have
that effect. Recognition that pardons granted for reasons which imply
guilt need not be given the same effect as pardons for innocence would
have solved the dilemma.
What has been said of licenses generally applies to the license to
practice law. Under the power of the courts to disbar attorneys found
to lack the moral character required for that office, the court may, of
course, disbar for professional misconduct which culminated in a conviction for crime. A pardon for such crime will not prevent the disbarment proceedings,3 9 nor will a pardon after disbarment entitle one
to reinstatement. 40 However, if the pardon was granted for the rea39. People ex reL. Deneen v. Gilmore, 214 IIl. 569, 73 N. E. 737, 69 L. R. A. 70,
People ex reL. Johnson v. George, 186 IIl. 122, 57 N. E. 804 (19oo) ; Nelson
v. Commonwealth, 128 Ky. 779, lO9 S. W. 337 (igo8); In the Matter of
an Attorney, 86 N. Y. 563 (i81) ; Wolfe's Disbarment, 288 Pa. 331, 135 Atl. 732, 50
A. L. R. 380 (1927) ; see People ex reL. Colorado Bar Ass'n v. Weeber, 26 Colo. 229,
231, 57 Pac. 1079, 1O8O (1899).
An attorney convicted of crime and pardoned in one state may nevertheless be disbarred in another state on the ground of such crime. People ex rel. Deneen v. Gilmore,
supra; People ex rel. Colorado Bar Ass'n v. Burton, 39 Colo. 164, 88 Pac. lO63 (1907)
semble. Since a conditional pardon admittedly does not have the effect of blotting out
guilt, it is agreed that a conditional pardon cannot prevent disbarment. It Re Sutton,
50 Mont. 88, 145 Pac. 6, Ann. Cas. 1917A, 1226 (1914); State ex reL. McLean v.
(1905) ;

Johnson, 174 N. C. 345, 93 S. E. 847 (1917).
40.

In the Matter of the Application of Riccardi, 64 Cal. App. 791,

222

Pac. 625

(1923) ; Branch v. State, 12o Fla. 666, 163 So. 48 (1935) ; Commonwealth ex reL. Har-

ris v. Porter, 257 Ky. 563, 78 S. W. (2d) 8oo (935) ; Matter of E, 65 How. Pr. 171
(N. Y. 1879) ; see Cohen v. Wright, 22 Cal. 293, 323 (1863). The right to practice
law is not a right of citizenship, and restoration to citizenship therefore does not restore the right to practice. People ex rel. Colorado Bar Ass'n v. Monroe, 26 Colo. 232,
57 Pac. 6g6 (1899).
"While the effect of the pardon was to relieve him of the penal consequences of
his act, it could not restore his character. It did not reinvest him with those qualities
which are absolutely essential for an attorney at law to possess. It could not rehabilitate
him in the trust and confidence of the court. Lawyers are officers of the court. They
are agents through whom justice must be administered. They should always be worthy
instruments of justice. Courts should never hesitate to disbar those who are morally
unfit to act as such agents."

Commonwealth v. Porter, 257 Ky. 563, 567, 78 S. W.

THE EFFECT OF PARDON

son that the conviction was a mistake, and that the defendant was in
fact innocent, the court ought to accept this finding and not allow such
41
wrongful conviction to serve as a basis for disbarment.
There are some cases in which the courts, misled by the dictum
that a pardon (not restricted to pardons for innocence) "blots out the
offense" and makes the offender "a new man", have found it difficult
to avoid the result that a pardon granted for whatever reason is a
complete defense to disbarment proceedings based on a pardoned
offense. Indeed, the case of Ex parte Garland42 itself, which we have
cited as the leading case, in which this "blotting-out" dictum was laid
down, 43 involved the right of a pardoned offender to practice law before the Supreme Court of the United States, and though the decision
on its own facts may be correct,44 the broad dictum and some of the
reasoning in the case support the notion that a pardon so completely
wipes out the crime that it cannot thereafter be the basis for disbarment.

45
At least one later case seems actually to reach that result,

and in several others a court avoided the same conclusion only by finding other facts

46

or by resorting to dubious

logic.

47

The New York

Court of Appeals, for example, in one case did disbar a convicted attorney notwithstanding a pardon, but in order to do so felt obliged itself
to adopt what Professor Williston called unpardonable reasoning. "The
pardon," said the court, "does reach the offense for which he was
convicted, and does blot it out, so that he may not now be looked
upon as guilty of it. But it cannot wipe out the act that he did, which
was adjudged an offense. It was done and will remain a fact for all
time." 48 How a crime can be said to have been blotted out, so that
the person cannot be looked upon as guilty of it, and yet leave the act
(2d) 8oo, 802 (935), quoting from Nelson v. Commonwealth, 128 Ky. 779, 789, 1o9
S. W. 337, 340 (908).
See Williston, supra note 5, at 655-7; (937) 21 MINN. L.
REv. 837.
41. See, for example, In the Matter of Petition of Kaufman, 245 N. Y. 423, 157
N. E. 730 (927).
42. 4 Wall. 333 (U. S. 1866).
43. See supra p. 177.
44. The only ground for holding that taking part in the rebellion (the offense in
question) would involve disbarment as a consequence was a statute which imposed as a
penalty disability to practice before the court.
45. In the Matter of Petition for Disbarment of Emmons, 29 Cal. App. 121, 154
Pac. 61g (i915).
46. Thus, in a Maine case, the court indicated it would have held the pardon sufficient to prevent disbarment, but it found that the attorney had been guilty of another
crime, which had not been pardoned. Penobscot Bar v. Kimball, 64 Me. 140 (875).
The defendant had forged a deposition, been convicted of forgery, and pardoned. The
court found that the pardon did not excuse his guilt in offering the deposition in evidence, and disbarred him for the latter offense.
47. See, for example, Nelson v. Commonwealth, 128 Ky. 779, 109 S. W. 337

(I9o8).
48. In the Matter of

, an Attorney, 86 N. Y. 563, 56! (188i).
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remaining as a fact so that he may be disbarred for it, comments Pro49
fessor Williston, is difficult to imagine.
In some states, disbarment is by statute made one of the penalties
imposed upon an attorney convicted of a felony, and in such states
it has been held that since disbarment is specifically made a part of the
legal punishment for the crime, a pardon wipes out such legal consequences, and is, therefore, a defense to a disbarment proceeding based
upon the conviction.
Even under such statutes, however, the better
rule would seem to be that the disbarment is not based ipso facto upon
the conviction, but upon the lack of moral character revealed by the
conviction, a fact not wiped out by the pardon, unless it is a pardon
granted upon a finding of innocence.
One of the most important of the early cases upon which the dictum that a pardon "blots out" guilt rests was a defamation case, Cuddington v. Wilkins,51 decided in 1615. The defendant in that case
had said of the plaintiff, "he is a thief". Upon being sued for slander,
the defendant undertook to justify his statement by alleging that the
plaintiff had stolen six sheep several years before. The plaintiff replied that since the supposed theft, a general pardon had been issued
and made the usual averments to bring himself within the pardon.
On demurrer, judgment was given for the plaintiff. The court said
the felony was by pardon extinct; and though the plaintiff was a thief
once, "yet when the pardon came it took away, not only poenam but

reatume".52
The opinion makes it fairly clear, however, that the court meant
only that the legal infamy of the conviction was removed, not that the
offender was "as innocent as if he had never committed the offense".
The report states: "And it was said, that he could no more call him
thief, in the present tense, than to say a man hath the pox, or is a villain after he be cured or manumissed, but that he had been a thief or
villain he might say." .5
This distinction has been followed in later cases both in England
and in this country. In a New York case decided in 1893, it was held
not actionable for one person to say of another that he had stolen an
axe several years before, where this statement was true and the guilty
man had been convicted but later pardoned.5 4 So in England it has
49. Williston, supra note 5, at 656.
5o. Ex Parte Crisler, 159 Miss. 247, 132 So. 103 (1931) ; J. L. Scott v. Texas, 6

Tex. Civ. App. 343, 25 S. W. 337 (1894).
51. Hobart 67, 8o Eng. Rep. R. 216 (K. B. 1625), same case, Hobart 81, 8o Eng.
Rep. R. 231 (K. B. 625).
52. Id. at 81, 8o Eng. Rep. R. at 231.
53. Id. at 82, 8o Eng. Rep. R. 232.
54. Baum v. Clause, 5 Hill 196 (N. Y. 1843).
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been held that for an editor to call a rival editor a "convicted felon"
was not actionable, where the rival had in fact been convicted of felony
but later pardoned; but to call him a "felon editor" was libel.'s
It should be obvious that the rule of these cases in no way supports the statement that a pardon makes a man "as innocent as if he
had never committed the offense". On the contrary, it recognizes the
fact that he had committed the offense, and holds statements of this
truth not to constitute defamation.
Suppose, however, that the pardon had been granted because
the person convicted was in fact innocent? None of the defamation
cases involved a pardon for that reason, and none discusses the question. It would seem that such a pardon should not merely make a
man "as innocent as if he had never committed the offense", but should
be a legal and binding determination that he did not in fact commit
it, and for any person to say that one whose name has been cleared in
this manner "had been a thief" should be just as actionable as if he
had said the same about a person who had been tried for the crime
but acquitted.
The immigration laws exclude from admission into this country
aliens "who have been convicted of or admit having committed a felony
or other crime or misdemeanor involving moral turpitude", and provide that if such aliens are admitted without immediate detection, they
should be deported. It has been held in two cases that the fact that
the alien was pardoned of the crime does not wipe out his disqualification.56 Neither of these cases, however, involved a pardon granted
for innocence, in which case it is submitted that he should not be considered disqualified.
Provisions of the naturalization laws, that an alien seeking naturalization must prove that he has behaved as a man of good moral
character during his residence in the United States, have been held
to make a pardoned convict ineligible. One court, after quoting the
dictum in Ex parte Garland, that a pardon blots out the offense and
makes the offender a new man, nevertheless concluded: "And yet I
do not suppose the opinion is to be understood as going the length of
holding that while the party is to be deemed innocent of the crime
by reason of the pardon from and after the taking effect thereof, that
it is also to be deemed that he never did commit the crime or was convicted of it. The effect of the pardon is prospective and not retrospective. It removes the guilt and restores the party to a state of
55. Leyman v. Latimer, 3 Ex. D. 15 (1877), 3 Ex. D. 352 (1878), (1877)

5 CENT.

L. J. 74, (1878) 6 CENT. L. J. 18I.
56. United States ex rel. Palermo v. Smith, 17 F. (2d) 534 (C. C. A. 2d,
Weedin v. Hampel, 28 F. (2d) 603 (C. C. A. 9th, 1928).

1927);
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innocence. But it does not change the past and cannot annihilate the
established fact that he was guilty of the offense." 57
Allowing for the court's attempt to reconcile the dictum of the
Supreme Court with its holding, the decision seems correct. Here
again the question in issue is not conviction, but character. But again
the court obviously had in mind only pardons granted for reasons
other than innocence. Pardons granted for this latter reason certainly
should "annihilate the established fact that he was guilty of the
offense", and should re-establish eligibility for citizenship.
To summarize: The conflict in judicial pronouncements regarding the effect of a pardon are attributable largely to the fact that no
distinction has ever been made by the courts between pardons granted
for innocence, and pardons for other reasons. Yet this distinction
seems fundamental. Most pardons are granted for considerations
of clemency, mercy, or a miscellany of motivations. Pardons granted
for innocence, however, are granted in strict justice. The innocent
person who has been wrongly convicted has been done a great injustice. Properly, the legal system should provide him a remedy in the
courts. It has been felt, however, that judicial decisions should not
forever remain open to repeated review. After a certain length of time,
they are final, and cannot be reopened. However, we have probably
been too strict in this respect. Anglo-American law has been peculiarly
indifferent to the problem of the person wrongfully convicted and later
found to be innocent, after the time for judicial review has elapsed.
Continental law has gone much further in permitting judicial reconsideration of such cases. This is obviously the logical and the only
really satisfactory solution.
It is only because the judicial remedy is no longer available that
we are forced to extend the flexible pardoning power to cover the situation. But this is a makeshift remedy at best. To pardon a man
for being innocent is irony. Nevertheless, until and unless we can liberalize our criminal procedure so as to allow judicial review when
newly discovered evidence shows that the wrong man has been convicted, we must rely upon the pardoning power. It has been the purpose of this paper to show that if pardon is to be used as a substitute
for reversal of the conviction in such cases, the pardon must be given
the full effect of a judicial reversal, and not the more limited effect of
ordinary pardons, which merely put an end to punishment and all
other legal consequences of the conviction but do not affect the established fact of guilt. To give pardons for innocence no greater effect
than this would work injustice in various respects. If we concede the
57. It re William Spenser,

22

Fed. Cas. No. 13234 at

922

(C. C. D. Ore. 1878).
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governor power to grant a pardon on the ground that he is convinced
that the person is innocent, then his decision in such a case should be
as legally binding as a judicial decision to the same effect. The convicted person has been found innocent by an official constitutionally
empowered to make such a decision, and he should be held to be innocent for all purposes, in whatever connection the question may arise.
The courts should be able to evolve this rule for themselves;
there is not a single case which denies the proposition. It may, however, be helpful in clarifying the matter for the legislatures to declare
by statute that every pardon should state on the face of the document
the reason for which it is granted; and that a pardon should have the
effect of relieving the convicted person from further punishment and
from all other legal consequences of the crime but should not absolve
from guilt, unless the pardon was granted on the ground of innocence.
Such a statute would not be an unconstitutional interference with the
governor's pardoning power, but would only be part of the rules and
regulations for the expeditious exercise of the power which the legislature is in every state authorized to enact.

